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WORDS OF HOPE: A POSTMODERN FAITH
SAMUEL SMITH
Assistant Professor of English
Messiah College

What we see now is like a dim image in a
mirror; then we shall see face-to-face.
What I know now is only partial; then it
will be complete-as complete as God's
knowledge of me.
St. Paul, 1
Corinthians 13:12

I would like to respond to Paul Nisly's recent essay,
"A Word of Hope," published in Faculty Dialogue 17 (Spring
1992): 113-17. That essay strikes me as a fairly typical
evangelical response to postmodern literary discourse, and I
wish to address Nisly's articulation of that response as an
accurate representation of a large sector of the evangelical
literary and hermeneutical community. I will offer a
critical response to some of the problems raised by Nisly's
paradigmatic stance toward language and texts.1 I profess
English at Messiah College, so I am a member of a community
which is committed to identifying and understanding humanity
in terms of the Christian story. I believe the essence of

this gospel to be God's presence in Christ reconciling the
world to God.
To begin, while I disagree with Nisly's assessment of
postmodern literary criticism, I too believe that "words,
though limited, are God's gift to us humans" (113, my
emphasis). But I do not believe that words are limited to
"a meaning which we can discover" (113). The sense of
discovering meaning occurs when we learn what our (or
another) interpretive community means by certain words or
groups of words; but the meaning of those words has been
created, revised, and often reshaped by the human community
that generated those words and through which those words
have passed. So there is a sense that as communities and
individuals we also use words to create and shape meaning.
In fact, that is the central thesis of postmodernism: the
creating and shaping of meaning by human communities and by
individuals thinking, speaking, and acting within the
context of communities.
For this reason I find Nisly's identification of what
he calls "postmodern meaninglessness" an inaccurate representation of
postmodern literary critical dialogue as a

whole. He misrepresents postmodernism by identifying only
its extreme formulations, and this enables him to describe
postmodern thinkers as absolute relativists who play
hide-and-seek games behind obscure and impenetrable language
(you would think they were all apocalypticists). But are
all postmodernists absolute relativists? Nisly would have
us believe so: "All language and all knowledge-we are told,
usually much less succinctly-is a matter of perspective;
your perspective, my perspective, anyone's perspective; and
no perspective is to be trusted" (114). I believe it is
true that all language and all knowledge is a matter of
perspective (and if you wish to hear a postmodernist say
this succinctly in "plain" language you should read Stanley
Fish). But most postmodernists do not identify that
perspective as subjectively as Nisly identifies it here.
That perspective is individual and personal in a real sense,
but it is just as significantly grounded in communal
understanding and in historically authorized paradigms that
have enabled clear and understandable agreement about
humanity and the universe until new paradigms displace or

supplement them (as when a Luther or an Einstein or a Freud
comes along). Thus it is not true, as Nisly asserts, that
the "postmodern view of language is rooted in a profound
skepticism about the possibility of arriving at any
commonality of meaning, any truth" (114). On the contrary,
postmodernist views of language are often rooted in a
profound humility regarding the limitations of human
understanding and the seemingly infinite possibilities of
human speech. Most postmodernists assume that humans in
community are every day arriving at commonality of meaning
and truth (notice how much and how often they are talking
intelligibly to one another?). For the postmodernist,
meaning and perspective is shaped and understood in the
context of interpretative communities, and this results in
hope as often as despair, and in dialogue more than
monologue (more meaning negotiated, less meaning assumed).

Nisly's own apparent assumptions about language lead
him to mistakenly identify postmodern theories of language
with particular postmodern worldviews: "Much of

contemporary literary theory is based on a worldview which
is-after one cuts through the complex verbiage-very similar
to Hazel Motes'. In brief, there is no truth, there are
only (possibly) useful interpretations for our times." (114)
But the "useful interpretations for our times" are the
truths by which we live: one century according to the laws
of Newtonian physics, or salvation through Church
sacraments, or the belief that St. Paul had forbidden women
to exercise leadership roles in the Church, and the next
century by the laws of Einsteinian physics, or salvation
through Luther's understanding of justification, or new
understanding that contextualizes St. Paul's comments in
favor of women assuming leadership roles in the Church. In
fact, a short review of the history of the interpretation of
the Bible reveals the Church changing its understanding of
Jesus and important texts like the letters of St. Paul.
Members of a given Christian community situated in a
particular time and place have lived by the interpretations
and understandings dominant for their particular time and
place.2 The postmodern thesis that humans can assert only

interpretations, not absolute knowledge, strikes me as a
very orthodox recognition of the finiteness of human
understanding.
The second rather unfair criticism that Nisly alleges
against postmodernists is their supposedly impossibly
obscure terminology. He approvingly quotes Victor
Brombert's remarks from his 1989 MLA Presidential Address:
there has been a "general tendency [for the literary critic]
to seek refuge in a highly specialized terminology, to lock
oneself up in hermetic discourse allowing for no
intellectual commerce" (114). And at first this seems true,
but this generalization ignores the rather substantial
intellectual commerce going on among postmodernists, a
commerce that often crosses national, racial, gender, and
communal boundaries other discourse communities fail to
cross. Two pages later Nisly quotes Brombert's caricature
of postmodern critical discourse: there is "considerable
silliness in most sophisticated contemporary criticism:
pretentious gibberish in the articles and books that flow
from our presses, hermetic clowning at tiresome symposia"

(116). I agree that many of the books and articles finding
their way into print in the humanities are not worthy of the
natural resources required to make them possible. But I
attribute this more to the pressure to publish than to
postmodern epistemologies and metaphysics. The truth is
that we are often as communities confronted with new
vocabularies or new ways of talking and negotiating meaning
that require the work of understanding on our part if we
wish to participate in the dialogues which these new
discourses enable.
Allow me to illustrate what I mean with a rather
non-academic example. I remember attending a Larry Norman
concert during the late 1970's , and he portrayed the
problems of Christian fundamentalist "witnessing" language
by imagining this scene: the Christian witness approaches a
man on the street and says, "Have you been born again,
brother?"
The man pauses, puzzled, and replies, "I don't believe
in reincarnation, and I can only remember having one
mother."

Stymied, the Christian witness starts over. "No, what
I mean is, have you been saved?"
The witnessee ponders a moment and answers, "Well,
several summers ago I was swimming in the lake at summer
camp, and I started to drown, and the lifeguard rescued me,
so I suppose you could say, 'yes, I have been saved.'"
Frustrated now, the Christian says with exasperation,
"No, that's not it at all! I want to know if you've been
washed in the blood of the lamb!"
The equally frustrated witnessee replies, "Ugh, I hope
not!"
Norman's simple scenario about the problems of special
fundamentalist Christian jargon illustrates how every
community develops language that shapes its understanding
but does not often easily communicate without extensive
explanation and translation into the language of another
community. (These same fundamentalist Christians who take
my first-year courses at Messiah College get a great deal of
sympathy from me-I was reared a fundamentalist-when they
balk at terms like Nisly's "Creative Word." These students

typically say something like, "Well, if he meant Jesus
Christ, why didn't he just say Jesus Christ?" A response
such as "Well, that's not exactly what he wants to say"
arouses their suspicion.)
In the literary community, this happens at a slightly
more complex level. I remember attending the 1987 Mideast
Regional Conference on Christianity and Literature at
Lynchburg College where Wheaton College Professor of English
Leland Ryken delivered a banquet speech that parodied and
indicted postmodernist discourse for what Brombert calls its
"pretentious gibberish" and "hermetic clowning." It was a
good time, and since most of us were members of the
evangelical and literary communities we understood each
other and laughed. But as I reflect on Ryken's performance
and the audience's general resistance to postmodern
discourse with its threat to their understanding of
Christian faith (and life in general) and its demand for
hard intellectual work for understanding, I am able to
imagine similar moments in earlier history.
During the fifth century A.D., a group of local Roman

pagan scholars gather at the local academy for a banquet and
address by one of their most admired members. Comfortable
in their centuries-old understanding of Stoic thinking,
these pagans laugh as their speaker spoofs and parodies the
new jargon emerging from the recent Church councils. But
instead of playing with terms like differance, implied
reader, aporia, phallocentric, or Transcendental Signified,
the speaker offers play on words like trinity, substance,
hypostatic union, immaculate conception (from the same
council who gave us hypostatic union!), and original sin.
The speaker finishes with a parodic paraphrase of the
obscure and impenetrable prose of Augustine amid belly
laughter and flowing tears.
Or imagine a similar banquet occurring in late
sixteenth-century Italy, where a group of Catholic scholars
gather to poke fun at the new thinking and vocabulary of
"Protestants." Now the new, bizarre terms tossed around
are terms like scripture interprets scripture (talk about
speech-acts!), substitutionary atonement, priesthood of he
believer, and presbyterian, and there is some laughter (and

concern, for they, like Ryken's audience are being
threatened) at the New Historicist and deconstructionist
readings of the Book of Revelation being performed by the
strange Englishman John Bale and John Foxe, and perhaps they
raise their eyebrows and ire at that expatriated French
nihilist, John Calvin.
These imagined anecdotes reveal that new words and new
ways of speaking and negotiating meaning make possible new
understandings of God, humanity, and the universe. And the
history of religions and the history of the Christian
religion in particular suggests that using language to
create and shape communal and individual knowledge enables
humans to define (set boundaries) and extend (push those
boundaries out, even over) their knowledge and
understanding. Indeed, in its origin the Christian religion
was an astonishing combination of an old vocabulary infused
with radical new meanings and a bold new vocabulary that
enabled human imaginations to stretch into new
understandings of God and God's love: the result was faith,
meaning, and new life for both individuals and communities.

In this light, I find it ironic that Christian
academics would censure postmodernists for new words and new
structures of thought when in most situations they would, as
a professors of the Humanities, both welcome and encourage
the learning of new vocabulary and new structures of thought
as a good thing that broadens and deepens thinking and
enables understanding. For example, I am sure most English
professors would be pleased that I introduce freshmen to the
new language of literary criticism in my course in English
Literature to 1660. I require them to learn such wonders as
anagogical interpretation, pastoral elegy, oxymoron, terza
rima, catharsis, romance epic (this one is not at all what
they first imagine), and conceit (this too is not what they
think). And because as a college professor I am granted a
bit of authority, and because students want to join the
conversation that knowing these terms makes possible, they
do the hard work of learning handbook definitions and
applying them in the "required" contexts (they really read
these definitions as absolutely authoritative until I reveal
their conventional nature by adjusting some of them in the

context of the literature we read). The only difference
between the freshman experience of learning new literary
terms and the experience of the literary critic who engages
postmodernist discourse is that the terms and discourse
learned by freshmen enjoy the broader authorization of the
literary community-they enjoy a more privileged status than
other similarly conventional terms and structures of new
"radical" discourses.
I am doing the work of reading and understanding
postmodern thinkers like Stanley Fish, David Bleich,
Patricinio Schweickart, Roland Barthes, Julia Kristeva, and
yes, even Jacques Derrida. It is true that Fish, Bleich,
and Schweickart are easier to read than Barthes, Kristeva,
and Derrida. They have the advantage of being native
speakers of American English with the kind of helpful
knowledge conventionally authorized by American communities.
But they are postmodernists who speak clearly in
vocabularies and structures even my students understand. (I
don't use postmodernist terminology in the classroom very
often, and yet I consistently teach as a postmodern

Christian.) In fact, learning the language of postmodernism
has been very much like my experience in learning the
languages and jargon of other disciplines such as
psychology, theology, and philosophy. And even the
evangelical community is filled with the most casual use of
the once new and obscure vocabularies of Marx, Freud, and
Jung (not to mention the apostle Paul). To finally exclude
the wisdom of postmodern thinking from Christian discourse
because the discourse is unfamiliar and perhaps difficult at
moments is to refuse to do the kind of work that any convert
to a Fundamentalist expression of evangelical Christianity
performs in order to master the knowledge of her salvation,
sanctification, and eschatological future in the space of
years or even months. After all, no one can deny that
Christian communities foster as much esoteric jargon as most
academic communities. Stop and think about an individual
from one Christian community who bothers to eavesdrop on an
"in-house" theological conversation between members of
another Christian community.
Finally, it is because I have both strengthened and

extended my understanding of and commitment to the Christian
story by reading and thinking through the discourse of
postmodernists like Stanley Fish and David Bleich that I
find most evangelical Christian representations and
assessments of postmodernism uninformed, oversimplified, and
unconvincing. And I don't find postmodernist epistemologies
threatening to either my Christian understanding of God or
my faith in God.
While I believe that my argument for learning new
vocabularies might actually persuade those who take a stance
similar to Nisley's, I suspect we will have more difficulty
with a second difference. Nisly asserts a foundational
tenet in his essay which I cannot, with anything like
conviction, espouse or commit myself to. Nisly believes in
the autonomous work: "yet our goal is to hear what the work
itself has to say" (116). What is the "work itself" apart
from the experience of a reader in community? Nisly here
echoes his earlier conventional bifurcation of "the primary
text and the interpretive word" (114). Such a dichotomy
will not stand under scrutiny. I see two problems here.

First, readers do not read texts and then interpret them.
Encountering texts with a particular worldview (often
well-developed even if the reader is not self-conscious of
it) or set of basic and not-so-basic individual and communal
assumptions, readers interpret in the very act of reading:
readers are never not interpreting when they are reading.3
They may not be developing an organized and detailed
interpretation for public presentation, but they are always
already interpreting and understanding during the act of
reading. Second, every "work" or "primary text" (they seem
to be the same thing for Nisly) is an articulation of an
interpretation of human experience as it is perceived by a
human subject with a worldview disposition in the context of
a particular community. The reality of the layers of human
interpretation involved in language and experience cannot be
suppressed with assertions of the "work itself."
I believe Paul Nisly intuitively knows this, as he
concedes crucial ground when he reiterates his theme:

I have argued that language is a special gift,
even a divine gift, and, further, I have contended

that within diversity we can work toward some
commonalities of meaning in the interpretation of
the text. The text does have its own integrity,
whether it is the biblical text, or the text of a
novel or play or poem or short story.
Interpretation is, however, a very human and
fallible art. (116)
"Exactly!" is the postmodernist reply. Interpretation is a
fallible art precisely because it is a human act; but as
Stanley Fish notes, "Interpretation is the only game in
town." Nisly's own language has made a very significant
shift here, as he is now talking about the text, not the
"work itself." But how does a text have
integrity-especially if that text has been transmitted over
centuries of human fallibility and was generated in the
context of a fallible human culture? A text that is not a
translation and does not have a re-publication history might
be credited with stability. But once we begin the act of
reading, we are never not interpreting the text, and the
minute we begin to discuss or write about the "text" we have
ventured into our understanding of the work as we have
constructed or deconstructed it during the act of reading
the text. The text cannot be equated with the novel or play
or poem or short story that we experience as readers. This

is why we have such wonderfully long and diverse histories
of the interpretation of many biblical texts, of Milton's
Eve, of Shakespeare's Hamlet, and Melville's white whale.
This is why every performance of Macbeth is another Macbeth.
The interpretation becomes/is the novel or play or poem or
short story for the reader interpreting/reading.
Paul Nisly's problematic sense of the text as work
informs one of his other very important assertions about
words and meaning. Nisly offers the following creed, safely
assuming communal support: "For we believe that both within
and behind the text there is meaning." But what is the
meaning "behind" the text? How does meaning get "behind"
the text? I turn the page and find more text (or the end
and so my own reflection).4 But since we share community, I
believe this remark is properly informed by-that is I
understand it in-the context of Nisly's earlier remark that
"the Creative Word, the Divine Word, who was from the
beginning with God, is linked with our ability to use words,
words which have meaningful content, words which we can
mutually explore" (115, my emphasis). This is for me the

most important sentence in Nisly's essay, and as a
postmodern Christian, I wholeheartedly affirm this.
But "meaningful content" arises in the context of human

interpretative activity and nowhere else, and in the context
of our "mutual exploration" of textual significance. The
"meaningful content" worked out and decided on, however, is
authorized by the interpretative communities doing the work
of "mutual exploration," not by the "work" (or text) itself.
This is why both traditional Christians with absolutist
epistemological and metaphysical claims and postmodern
Christians with relativist epistemological and metaphysical
claims (don't be fooled into thinking I am not claiming
something quite understandable in this essay) keep talking,
writing, and dialoguing both with those who do and with
those who do not share their Christian faith.
But the recognition that dialogue and "mutual
exploration" enable and provoke clarification and common
understanding (as in everyday responses like "what did you
mean by that?") also highlights that this is precisely what
written texts cannot do, especially if the author of the

text is dead. The problems with biblical texts are obvious.
Paul begins 1 Corinthians 7 (a vexed text, a source of great
physical and psychological pain in the history of the Church
interpreting and submitting to interpretations of the text)
by saying that he is answering certain questions posed by
the Corinthians. Nowhere are we told what these questions
are. We have no definitive context to assure our getting
Paul's intentions "right." And how do we read a term like
"inspiration" in 2 Timothy 3:16? The word is used only one
time in the New Testament and applies there only to the
Hebrew Scripture. It has perhaps as many definitions as
there are communities who care enough to try to give it
definite meaning. In fact, the human attempt to define the
meaning of inspiration and its ramifications has been
responsible for many of the dividing boundaries between
particular Christian communities. And why is Jesus
represented in the Gospel as cursing the fig tree? We have
no Gospel writer come from the grave to solve this crux. We
are left with our interpretive attempts, and we cannot write
or call the author even if the author could be of some help

in establishing context and "intent."
I have turned to the example of Scripture because I
believe that what really motivates evangelicals who
sympathize with Nisly's excursions against postmodernism is
a fear of the instability, chaos, and anarchy in the
Christian community which they think will result from the
apparent loss of a stable text or "common work"-a work/text
that has often been accorded supernatural divine status. I
believe that such a fear, if it is indeed motivating the
common evangelical exclusion of postmodern approaches from
the Christian community, is ill-founded. No work, not even
the Bible, is finally or essentially stable: this is a
reality borne out in the history of biblical interpretation.
This is a reality borne out in the fact that the divine text
does not define "itself" in the same way for all those
devout readers who sincerely commit themselves to
understanding themselves and God in the context of its
pages. This does not mean that the Bible does not enjoy a
great measure of stability in communities that share
interpretative assumptions and strategies: it does. But

Stanley Fish's observation about the text of Milton's Samson
Agonistes also applies to the biblical texts: they are
"stable in more than one direction, as a succession of
interpretive assumptions give [them] a succession of stable
shapes" (274).
One solution for the lack of a "common work" is present
in the example Nisly provides shortly after his confession
of hope in the meaningful "content" of words. He offers an
anecdote about a preacher who presumed to offer the
definitive interpretation of Jesus' parable about sewing the
new cloth on the old garment. Nisly remarks that the
preacher's interpretation "did not seem persuasive to me"
(115). This is essentially a postmodern moment for Nisly.
His use of the term "persuasive" reminds me of Stanley
Fish's distinction between demonstration and persuasion and
his argument that "all uses of language are interpretations
of reality" (243), and that since interpretive communities
authorize textual understanding, postmodern discourse will
be necessarily characterized by dialogue and persuasion, not
monologue and demonstration (demonstration is what

traditional, positivist epistemologies attempt to do). And
so even in Christian communities, we attempt to persuade
others to accept and believe our understanding of biblical
texts and God's purposes; demonstration can occur only in
the context of communally accepted and authorized boundaries
which are, in the larger picture, undeniably conventional.5
In other words, such "demonstration" is really persuasion in
the guise of "evidence." If you believe in the validity of
certain kinds of evidence and methods of demonstrating what
is "true," then such efforts can be used to persuade you.
Thus it is the interpretative community that provides
stability and order, not the text or work. To look for such
stability and order from the text or work is to fool oneself
willingly. Often we do not realize this because many
interpretations and understandings lead long lives and begin
to appear as "self-evident" truths, and some interpretations
experience glorious resurrections after an ignominious death
at the hands of what has become for a new generation a
"less-enlightened" older generation of readers and
thinkers. To say this is also to recognize that the

interpretative community also provides the context for
challenges to stability and order established by certain
communal understandings of particular texts. New readings
and new uses of the "authoritative" text arise constantly.
A good example of this is the early Christian community's
new understanding and use of the Jewish Scriptures in
first-century Palestine.
In conclusion, while I affirm language as God's gift to
humanity, I do not believe language or "reality" has a
meaning which we discover or find, that is meaning that is
absolute, universal, objective, or inherent in the universe
we "find" ourselves in. The meanings that we do "discover,"
or feel that we "discover," are meanings created, shaped,
and decided by the numerous human communities that have
preceded our own. Human beings in community create, shape,
and decide the meaning of human experience and how that is
to be understood in the context of a communally authorized
understanding of God. I agree with Robert M. Grant's
contextualization of the New Testament texts:

[F]or it was the church in which and for which the

texts were written, by members of the church; it
was the church which preserved, selected, and
transmitted the texts. The central meaning or
cluster of meanings is therefore to be found
within the church's life and understandings,
broadly considered. (143)
When we always approach the Christian canon with rigid
assumptions about its unity, coherence, or "flatness" (that
is as a static work), we hazard missing the way in which the
texts in the biblical canon dialogue with one another,
providing a paradigm for the kind of sacred dialogue we
should be involved in and carrying on as Christians. The
differences in detail and purpose among the four Gospels
suggest the need for continuing dialogue about the meaning
of Jesus.
At this point I would like to describe the big picture
of my understanding of human experience, the world, and God.
Unlike Calvin, I see the universe as an open universe. God
has not inscribed detailed meanings into material phenomena
or the experience of the "spiritual." God has not
determined the details of individual, national, or racial
histories. God has not encoded into the universe and human
experience a meaning which can only be discovered or found.

Instead, God has created an open universe where beings made
in God's image have the freedom to shape and reshape their
understanding of human experience. God has created an open
universe where all human decisions and uses of language have
meaning. God has infused God's infinite divinity into a
universe where God delights in the interpretative and
community-building activities of humans who have the genuine
capacity to surprise and delight God. This is not the
nihilism of Calvinism-sovereignty does not demand absolute
divine control and manipulation of the details of human
history and life. Sovereignty means God will use divine
power to finally redeem everything human.6
When I look at Donald Hettinga's struggle to continue
asserting an absolute reality even as his discussion of the
New Rhetoricians pulls him in the other direction, so that
he just as often speaks insights possible only in a
postmodern paradigm, I wonder why he wants to cling to an
absolutist epistemology and metaphysic that prefers evidence
to faith (75, 82).7 We are not called to prove or
demonstrate our Christian faith claims: yet

proof-demonstration-is the definitive function of an
absolutist epistemology. We are called to confess our
Christian faith and live and speak in a way that persuades
others to embrace the Christian story and live in the
context of the communally established authority we have
forged for that story. This can be done in the framework of
a relativist epistemology; in fact, I am doing just that.
Indeed, to echo Luther, I can do no other. Here I
stand, so help me God. The truth of the postmodern
epistemological and metaphysical paradigm I have used to
critique the too common evangelical view of language and
texts as represented by Paul Nisly's essay convicts me with
all the force of any Holy spirit that convinced Luther of
the truths of the nominalist philosophy that eventually
shaped his understanding of St. Paul. I am committed to
understanding God and human experience in the paradigm of
the Christian story because the possibilities for
responsible and ethical living in Christian community seem
to me to be greatest. And it is the Christian community
which authorizes the sacred texts-not the other way around.

And, finally, I have faith in God, a faith, as Sam Keen
would put it, that has "survived the death of many
beliefs."8 Echoing St. Paul, I say that my knowledge of
truth is partial; and I find myself trusting God's knowledge
of me, not my knowledge of God. And as a postmodern
Christian I affirm with St. Paul that "[m]eanwhile these
three remain: faith, hope, and love; and the greatest of
these is love (1 Corinthians 13:13).

Notes
1After discussing Paul Nisly's essay with him, I believe
it would be more accurate to say that I am offering a
critical response to the ways in which I suspect and
anticipate many of my conservative evangelical colleagues in
the Christian College Coalition will read (interpret)
Nisly's essay (in fact, the way I myself would have read
the essay five or six years ago). In my discussion with
Paul respecting this, I believe he realizes that his essay
will be read by many in the way I anticipate; even as author
he cannot control readers' interpretations of his writing.
(Although, unlike dead authors, he may respond, as I have
welcomed him to do to this critique.)
2For more on this I recommend Jaroslav Pelikan's Jesus
Through the Centuries: His Place in the History of Culture
(New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1985) and Robert M.
Grant and David Tracy's A Short History of the
Interpretation of the Bible, 2nd ed., revised and enlarged
(Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1984).
3Readers interested in hermeneutics will recognize by my
language that I owe a large debt to Stanley Fish's Is There

a Text in This Class?: The Authority of Interpretive
Communities (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1980)
both for the kind of language and the kind of theoretical
structure that enables me to articulate both my criticism of
one understanding of language and my own paradigm for
Christian faith.
4I am deliberately playful here, for I suppose that Paul
Nisley's meaning in a term like "behind" the text (and since
we share a number of communities I am confident in going
"behind" Nisly's text for understanding) is roughly similar
to David Tracy's: "in the mind of the author, in the
original social setting, in the original audience." Of
course, Tracy's recognition of author, setting, and audience
suggests that meaning "behind" a text is also negotiated.
But I also agree with Tracy that "the primary meaning of the
text does not lie 'behind' it nor even 'in' the text
itself"; instead, "the meaning of the text lies in front
of the text-in the now common question, the now common
subject matter of both text and interpreter" (159). The
relation between the words "common" and "community" make
this realization particularly relevant to my emphasis on the
community as the negotiator and authorizer of meaning.
5The idea of convention is very helpful for an
understanding of my argument. Again, the context for my
thinking can be found in Fish:
I am not claiming that there are no facts; I am
merely raising a question as to their status: do
they exist outside conventions of discourse (which
are then more or less faithful to them) or do they
follow from the assumptions embodied in those same
conventions? . . . What I have been suggesting is
that identification (or specification of facts) is
always within a story. Some stories, however, are
more prestigious than others; and one story is
always the standard one, the one that presents
itself as uniquely true and is, in general, so
accepted. Other, nonstandard, stories will of
course continue to be told, but they will be
regarded as nonfactual, when, in fact, they will
only be nonauthorized. (237, 239)

6Some readers might recognize here my affinity with Mark
S. McCleod's "multi-realist" epistemology as expressed in
"Making God Dance: Postmodern Theorizing and the Christian
College," Christian Scholar's Review 21.3 (March 1992):
275-92.
7"In the world we come to know there is the reality, the
evidence of an all-powerful, all-loving God, a reality that
is discernible through personal experience, but a reality
that is not merely personal because it is accessible to all,
or at least for all for whom the veil is removed" (Donald
Hettinga, "Christians in the Worlds of Discourse," Faculty
Dialogue 17 (Spring 1992): 75, my emphases). Hettinga's
last clause, "for all for whom the veil is removed,"
deconstructs the preceding assertions, since such
"knowledge" and discernment come only to those for whom the
veil is removed, guaranteeing its "personal" nature and
suggesting its capricious ways. There is also the
difficulty in realizing that "evidence" is evidence only
when it is interpreted or construed as such, and those of us
who have lived through personal experiences that more
clearly suggest the absence or powerlessness or carelessness
of God will have some difficulty joining Hettinga in
construing our experience to reflect the reality he is
arguing for; for us there can only be faith and hope,
without knowledge and evidence. In some cases, our faith
and hope strains against the weight of countering knowledge
and evidence: it is love alone (God is love) that
sustains.
8Sam Keen, To a Dancing God (New York, NY: Harper & Row,
1970), dedication page.

